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I PARTIES 
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant; 
vs. 
WILLIAM S. LOVE and IRENE C. LOVE; CONMART, INC., a Utah 
corporation; SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the 
State of Utah; KATIE L. DIXON, an individual and in her capacity 
as former Salt Lake County Recorder; and JOHN DOES I through III; 
Defendants and Appellees. 
WILLIAM S. LOVE and IRENE C. LOVE, 
Counterclaimants and Third Party Plaintiffs; 
vs. 
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Utah Corporation; UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION; WILLIAM J. LOWENBERG, 
WESTERN MANAGEMENT, a partnership; SMITH, HALANDER & SMITH, a 
partnership; MINSON-HALANDER, Inc., a Utah corporation; H. FRED 
SMITH; RONALD W. SMITH; DALE N. MINSON; ROBERT S. HALANDER; 
MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts 
corporation; MARILYN M. HENRIKSEN, solely in her capacity as 
trustee; and JOHN DOES 1 - 1 0 ; 
Counterclaim and Third Party Defendants. 
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III TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
A. Cases: 
Warren v. Provo City Corporation, 838 P.2d 1125 (UT 
1992) 
Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868 (UT 1990) 
Meyers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (UT 1981) 
Burlington Northern, Inc. v. L.P. Hall, 322 N.W.2d 233 
(N.D. 1982) 
B. Rules, Statutes, other: 
§63-30-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 
§63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 
IV STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This case is before the Court upon appellant's appeal of an 
Order of the Third Judicial District Court, Stephen L. Henriod, 
J., granting the motion of Salt Lake County and Katie Dixon to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon 
consideration of said motion, the District Court considered 
matters outside the pleadings, i..e. , affidavit of William 
Meaders, with exhibits; deposition of Marlene Peterson; affidavit 
of Marlene Peterson; and affidavit of Debra DeRose, with 
exhibits. In granting County's and Dixon's motion to dismiss, 
the trial court thus treated the motion as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of it as provided in Rule 56, Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure. Jurisdiction to hear the appeal of Appellant of 
the Order of Dismissal entered by the court below is established 
by § 78-2-2(3)(k)# U.C.A., 1953 as amended. 
V STATEMENT OF ISSUE(S) PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented upon appeal concerning appellees County 
and Dixon is simply whether appellant presented its claim against 
appellees within the limitation period of one year as required by 
§63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
As a decision granting a motion for summary judgment, the 
standard of review to be applied by this Court is to review the 
trial court's decision for correctness. [Warren vs. Provo City 
Corporation, 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (UT 1992)]. 
VI STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF WHICH IS DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL 
OR WHICH ARE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE - SET OUT VERBATIM WITH 
APPROPRIATE CITATION. 
A. §63-30-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
§63-30-11 Claim for injury - Notice - Contents - Service - Legal 
disability. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of the employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity 
before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
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B. §63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 
§63-30-13 Claim against political subdivision or its employee -
Time for filing notice. 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision 
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year 
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension 
of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or 
not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
(In 1991 and 1993, the foregoing statutes differed slightly 
in nouns, pronouns, etc., but were identical in their substantive 
requirements.) 
VII STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellees County and Dixon accept appellant's statement of 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its 
disposition in the trial court. For the purposes only of the 
issue before this Court concerning appellees County and Dixon, 
said appellees also accept appellant's statement of facts and 
stipulate that there no issues of fact relative to that issue. 
VIII SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's cause of action 
against County and Dixon should be upheld for the reasons set 
forth hereafter. Plaintiff's cause of action arose in January or 
February, 1991. Plaintiff admits as such. [Appellants brief, p. 
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47; Amnded Complnt, 1 42, (R. 789.)] Plaintiff submitted its 
claim upon that cause of action, under the procedures required by 
§ 63-30-13, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, on August 4, 1997. [R. 946-
950.] To toll the limitation period established in §63-30-13 for 
five and one-half years, plaintiff must fit itself within the 
criteria established by this court in Warren vs. Provo City 
Corporation, 838 P.2d 1125 (UT 1992). Those criteria are: (1) 
situations where the rule calling for tolling the period for 
limitation of actions until discovery of the cause of action is 
mandated by statute (e.g., §78-12-19, U.C.A.), (2) situations 
where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action 
because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct, and 
(3) situations where the case presents exceptional circumstances 
and application of the general rule would be irrational or 
unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has 
prevented the discovery of the cause of action. (Warren, supra, 
at 1129.) Of those criteria, the only one applicable is the 
third stated above, i.e., existence of exceptional circumstances 
making application of the general rule irrational or unjust. 
There is no specific statute mandating tolling in this case, and, 
since the second criterion calls for evidence of intentional, 
misleading conduct, there is no evidence to bring it into 
consideration. Thus, defendants County and Dixon's contention 
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that the statute of limitations has run must be measured by the 
facts peculiar to this case to determine whether exceptional 
circumstances exist to excuse plaintiff's failure to file its 
claim as required by §63-30-13, U.C.A.. As will be pointed out 
hereafter, it is obvious from plaintiff's own exhibits and 
admissions in its brief before this Court that there are no 
exceptional circumstances which would justify a tolling of the 
limitation period until August 4, 1996, which is one year before 
plaintiff submitted its notice of claim to Salt Lake County's 
governing body. Thus, since plaintiff either knew, or should 
have known, of the existence of its alleged cause of action prior 
to August 4, 1996, plaintiff unjustifiably submitted its notice 
of claim beyond the one-year limitation period allowed by §63-30-
13. As a consequence, its claim is barred. 
IX ARGUMENT 
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE 
OF ACTION AGAINST APPELLEES SALT LAKE COUNTY AND KATIE 
L. DIXON WAS PROPERLY ENTERED UPON BASIS OF PLAINTIFF'S 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
The issue on appeal involving Salt Lake County and Katie L. 
Dixon is a narrow one. Simply stated, County and Dixon assert 
the affirmative defense that plaintiff failed to submit its claim 
against County and Dixon within the limitation period of one year 
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established by §63-30-13, U.C.A., 1953 as amended. This 
limitation period, even though set forth as part of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, and not within the general chapter 
concerning limitation of actions (Title 78, Chapter 12, U.C.A.), 
is considered and applied by this Court in the same manner as a 
statue of limitations. Warren, supra, at 1128. 
At the time of the negligence alleged by plaintiff in its 
complaint, Katie Dixon was the selected Recorder for Salt Lake 
County, and was, at all times pertinent to plaintiff's complaint, 
acting within the scope of her duties as an officer of Salt Lake 
County. [Amnded Complnt 1j 44, R. 790.] Thus, by virtue of §63-
30-11, U.C.A., the one year limitation period of §63-30-13(2), 
U.C.A., applies also to plaintiff's complaint against Ms. Dixon. 
Any cause of action against County and Dixon accrued "upon 
the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause 
of action. . .(and) mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of 
action (did) not prevent the running of the statute of 
limitations." (Warren, supra, at 1128-1129). Thus, the statute 
of limitations upon plaintiff's cause of action against County 
and Dixon began to run, according to plaintiff's own admission 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 47), no later than January or February, 
1991. That was six years and six months before August 4, 1997 -
the date plaintiff presented its claim against County and Dixon 
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to County's governing body. Unless excused, plaintiff was five 
years and six months too late. 
Plaintiff claims it should be excused from the lateness of 
its notice of claim under the doctrine established by this Court 
in Warren, supra, as well as in other cases involving statutes of 
limitation, rKlinaer vs. Kiahtlv, 791 P.2d 868 (UT 1990), Myers 
vs. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (UT 1981)], which hold that limitation 
periods may be tolled where exceptional circumstances would make 
the application of the limitation period irrational or unjust. 
However, even in such "exceptional" circumstances, the tolling 
would end, and the period of limitations would begin, when the 
plaintiff "knew or should have known" of the existence of its 
cause of action against County and Dixon. (Warren, supra; 
Klinger, supra, Meyers, supra). 
The trial court found that plaintiff "knew or should have 
known" that it had a cause of action against County and Dixon 
prior to August 4, 1996 (R. 1313) and granted County's and 
Dixon's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff now asserts before this 
Court that it should it be excused from the "know or should have 
known" standard at any time prior to August 4, 1996. Not only 
that, says plaintiff, but it did not, in fact, actually know of 
County's and Dixon's alleged negligence for nearly another year, 
i.e., July 2, 1997! ! 
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Since the question whether the "know or should hatve known'' 
standard applies in a particular case is one of law and not of 
fact (Klinger, supra, at 869) this Court may now weigh 
plaintiff's current claim of innocent bewilderment at the wrong 
allegedly done by the County Recorder in light of all the 
circumstances of this case. As a question of law, this Court 
makes no deference to the findings of the trial court.. However, 
an examination of the circumstances will surely lead this Court 
to the same conclusion as that of the court below. 
This Court stated in Warren,, supra, at 1129: 
The ultimate determination of whether a case presents 
exceptional circumstances that render the application 
of a statute of limitations irrational or unjust turns 
on a balancing test. However, before a court reaches 
this test, an initial showing must be made that the 
plaintiff did not know of and could not reasonably have 
known of the existence of the cause of action in time 
to file a claim within the limitation period. 
Let us examine the plaintiff's explanation for its failure 
to discover its cause of action for more than six and one-half 
years after it arose. We may recall that plaintiff admits that 
its cause of action arose in January or February, 1991, because, 
according to plaintiff, that would have been the time the County 
Recorder's office negligently omitted to properly record the 1991 
Corrective Warranty Deed as required by Utah's recording statute. 
(1|42, Amnded Cmplnt, R. 789.) For the purposes of this appeal, 
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County and Dixon accept plaintiff's claim that it did not 
initially have actual knowledge of the Corrective Warranty Deed 
which was recorded on January 23, 1991. (Aff. Mark Snyder, R. 
268.) Plaintiff admits, however, that on or about April 12, 
1996, it was aware that Loves claimed an easement over its 
property. (Appellants' brief, p. 48). And, as evidenced by 
letter dated May 23, 1996, (Appellant's Addendum., Ex. 1 of Ex. 
6) and admitted by plaintiff in its brief (Appellant's brief, p. 
48), plaintiff's attorney had completed an initial evaluation of 
I 
the claimed easement and of the efficacy of the corrective 
warranty deed which purported to create the easement ("Fact 8", 
p.2, plntf's memo in opp to mot to dismiss, R. 1073) by May 23, 
1996. (emphasis added.) Considering the first of those 
admissions, and giving plaintiff the benefit of a week or two to 
return to the Recorder's office to examine the source of Loves' 
claim of easement, plaintiff should have known of the alleged 
negligence in recording the Corrective Warranty Deed by at least 
April 26, 1996. Considering the second of those admissions, 
plaintiff must have had actual knowledge of the alleged 
negligence no later than May 23, 1996, since plaintiff's attorney 
had, by that time examined the efficacy of the Corrective 
Warranty Deed. 
It is also instructive to note that immediately after April 
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12, 1996, plaintiff tendered its defense against Loves' claim of 
easement to its title insurance company. (Appellant's Brief, p. 
48.) The defense wasn't tendered to just anyone. It was 
tendered to a professional title insurance company - a company 
with vast experience and expertise in the examination of chains 
of title and the manner and means of recording documents, and 
which has staked great sums of money in reliance upon that 
experience and expertise. 
Plaintiff now seems to want us to consider these 
professionals as rubes who, upon receipt of the tender of defense 
against Loves' claim of easement, took a look at the 1991 
Corrective Warranty Deed and said, "Well, well. What do you 
know? From the looks of this deed, which, by the way, has a 
bunch of recording information stamped on it, such as it being 
document 5,015,202 with a recording date of January 23, 1991 and 
recorded in book 6284, at page 1366 of Salt Lake County's 
recorded documents of title, the Loves appear to have an easement 
over the property we have insured as being free of such 
encumbrances. I guess we just missed this thing. Obviously, we 
screwed up. Well, there's no sense in going back into the 
records now to find out why or how we made such a colossal 
mistake." 
On the contrary, the moment plaintiff, especially its title 
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insurance company, heard of, or saw a copy of that 1991 
corrective warranty deed, they must have, and at the very least, 
should have, been on notice that something was awry, either in 
the recording of that document or in their research. Their claim 
of ignorance of a potential cause of action against the office of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder, past May 23, 1996, flies in the 
face of the facts and of common sense. Being aware of a 
potential cause of action, plaintiff was not entitled to sit back 
and ignore the matter, especially in light of the Utah law 
requiring claims against governmental entities to be filed within 
one year of the date they arise. In this case, if an error in 
recording had occurred, it would be obvious that it would have to 
have occurred at some point between the date the document was 
accepted for recording and date stamped (January 23, 1991), and 
July, 1993, the date the title insurance examiners would have 
researched the chain of title on plaintiff's behalf when 
plaintiff purchased its parcel from Conmart. Plaintiff and 
plaintiff's experts in title examination were under a duty to act 
with all due diligence to formulate their claim, if any they had, 
against Salt Lake County for negligence in the recording 
procedures applicable to the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. 
Plaintiffs' admit as much in their brief to this Court by 
stating, at page 34, UA person on inquiry notice who does not 
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make inquiry is deemed to have constructive notice and is not a 
purchaser in good faith" - citing Burlington Northern, Inc., vs. 
L.P. Hall, 322 N.W.2d 233 (N.D. 1982). The duty to inquire arose 
as soon as plaintiff and its agents became aware of Love's claim 
of easement. They were obligated to act with dispatch - not at 
their leisure. 
This is the heart of County's and Dixon's motion to dismiss 
plaintiff's alleged cause of action against them. This is a case 
involving large sums of money, with a corporate plaintiff, 
professional title examiners, title insurance companies, and real 
estate attorneys. The delay of those agents in pursuing the 
obvious possibility of error in the recording of the 1991 
Corrective Warranty Deed cannot be excused. This high-powered 
legal talent and expertise (see qualifications as recited in 
Affidavit of Arlen Taylor, 1)1's 1-11, R. 391-193, 395) simply 
dropped the ball. They cannot now be indulged in the claim that 
their delay in actually discovering the alleged negligence, 
especially immediately after April 12, 1996 and no later than May 
23, 1996, is excusable. Their position is especially ludicrous 
in light of plaintiff's claim that they did not actually learn of 
the County's alleged negligence until July 2, 1997 - after 
approximately 18 months of discussions, legal wranglings, and 
negotiations between plaintiff and plaintiff's attorneys and the 
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Loves and their attorneys. 
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in 
"penalizing" Arnold for settlement efforts. The limitation 
period in the notice requirement of the Governmental Immunity Act 
is a statute of limitations. (Warren, supra) . Every lawsuit 
involves consideration of such matters as settlement. Statutes 
of limitations have never been tolled to allow the parties time 
to negotiate settlement until those efforts fail before filing 
their lawsuit. Plaintiff further contends that it had no reason 
to suspect negligence on the part of the County because the 
negligence hid itself. How can such an assertion be made with a 
straight face? Starting with a document stamped with a document 
number, a book and page notation, and a recording date, how can 
professional title examiners avoid the question which fairly 
screams out for an answer, "Why didn't we find this deed?" What 
stymied an effort on their part to find whether that document was 
properly recorded? What else is needed to examine, e.g., the 
tract index? Plaintiff's answer to these questions, before the 
trial court and in its brief to this Court, is specious. 
Finally plaintiff claims in pp. 50-51 of its brief that it 
is unreasonable to expect them to learn of County's and Dixon's 
alleged negligence in only 114 days between April 12, 1996 and 
August 4, 1996. Plaintiffs had the advantage of a copy of the 
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actual document in question, with recording information stamped 
upon it, to begin its search. All the search required was to 
find out details concerning one document - not an entire chain of 
title. Such a search would require less than an afternoon. 
Surely it is incredible to assert a need for more than one to two 
weeks, much less 114 days, to accomplish such a simple task. 
X CONCLUSION STATING PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
In conclusion, County and Dixon pray for an Order of this 
Court affirming the Order and Judgment of the Third District 
Court which dismissed plaintiff's cause of action against them. 
XI CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM 
1. Warren vs. Provo City Corporation 
2. Klinger v. Rightly 
3. Meyers v. McDonald 
4. Section 63-30-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 
5. Section 63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 
Respectfully submitted this /i-^day of ^=^^^^**- , 
2001. 
KEVAN F. SMITH 
Deputy District Attorney for Salt 
Lake County 
Attorney for Appellees Salt Lake 
County and Katie L. Dixon 
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ADDENDUM 
1. 
Warren vs. Provo City Corporation 
WARREN v. PROVO CITY CORP. 
Cites*638 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992) 
Utah H25 
Returning to the present case, Arguello 
contends that personal jurisdiction is appro-
priate because Industrial placed the ma-
chine in the stream of commerce by its sale 
to Pickering in California and that it was 
foreseeable that the machine would be re-
sold in Utah. Industrial responds that the 
machine never entered the stream of com-
merce because it was sold to an ultimate 
buyer and resale of the machine in Utah 
was wholly unforeseeable. We agree with 
Industrial. The facts are analogous to 
those in World-Wide Volkswagen. There, 
the Court found that the New York defen-
dants could not have anticipated being ha-
led into court in Oklahoma because they 
sold no cars in Oklahoma, they did not 
serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma mar-
ket, they did not advertise in Oklahoma, 
and they had no salespersons in Oklahoma. 
444 U.S. at 295, 100 S.Ct at 566. Here, 
Industrial could not have reasonably antici-
pated being haled into court in Utah be-
cause it sold no finger jointing machines in 
Utah and it did not seek to serve the Utah 
market for finger jointing machines 
through either sales representatives or ad-
vertising. In addition, Utah accounts for 
0.3 percent of Industrial's total sales, and 
these are almost exclusively sales of parts 
which are initiated by requests from Utah 
businesses. It was wholly unforeseeable 
that Industrial would be subject to a suit in 
Utah involving a finger jointing machine. 
Other facts make this case even weaker 
than World-Wide Volkswagen for the ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction. In that 
case, a car was the subject of the suit, and 
it was at least foreseeable that a car sold in 
New York might, at some point, be driven 
in Oklahoma. In the present case, howev-
er, the subject of the suit is a large, immo-
bile jointing machine. Moreover, the con-
clusion that it was sold to an ultimate buy-
er is evidenced by the fact that Pickering, 
the initial purchaser, requested specialized 
modifications to the machine before deliv-
ery and paid sales tax, which strongly sug-
gests that resale was not planned. Indus-
trial never attempted to enter the machine 
into a stream of commerce that ran to 
Utah. The machine arrived in Utah due 
only to the unforeseeable sale by Pickering 
to Weathershield, not from any deliberate 
action by defendant 
We conclude that neither the "arising out 
of theory nor the "stream of commerce" 
theory will support a finding of the mini-
mum contacts necessary for assertion of 
jurisdiction over Industrial for the pur-
poses of Arguello's claims. Because juris-
diction cannot be asserted in accordance 
with the due process clause, the district 
court's decision is affirmed. 
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate C.J., and 
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
Charles R. WARREN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, a munic-
ipal corporation; James R. Mathis, air-
port manager for Provo City Corpora-
tion Airport; and John Does 1-10, De-
fendants and Appellees. 
No. 910217. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 23, 1992. 
Pilot injured in crash of airplane which 
he had leased from flying club brought 
action against city for city's alleged failure 
to enforce ordinance regulating flying 
clubs. The Fourth District Court, Utah 
County, Ray M. Harding, J., granted sum-
mary judgment for city, and pilot appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Hall, CJ., held that: 
(1) exceptional circumstances exception to 
application of statute of limitations did not 
apply to pilot's action, and (2) concealment 
version of discovery rule did not apply to 
pilot's action. 
Affirmed. 
1126 Utah 838 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
1. Judgment <s=>183 
When affidavits or other evidence is 
presented in conjunction with motion to 
dismiss, motion is treated as motion for 
summary judgment Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 
12(b)(6), 56(c). 
2. Appeal and Error <s»934(l) 
In appeal from summary judgment, 
Supreme Court views facts in light most 
favorable to party opposing motion. 
3. Judgment <3=>181(1), 185(2) 
Summary judgment is appropriate if, 
viewing evidence in light most favorable to 
nonmoving party, moving party is never-
theless entitled to judgment as matter of 
law. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
4. Appeal and Error e»863 
Supreme Court reviews trial court's de-
cision granting motion for summary judg-
ment for correctness. 
5. Municipal Corporations <s»741.1(5) 
Notice of claim provisions in Govern-
mental Immunity Act operate as one-year 
statute of limitations in cases brought 
against governmental entity. U.C.A.1953, 
63-30-11, 63-30-13. 
6. Limitation of Actions *»95(1) 
Cause of action accrues and relevant 
statute of limitations begins to run upon 
happening of last event necessary to com-
plete cause of action and mere ignorance of 
existence of cause of action does not pre-
vent running of statute of limitations; how-
ever, in certain instances, discovery rule 
allows for tolling of statute of limitations 
until discovery of facts forming basis for 
cause of action. 
7. Limitation of Actions e»95(l), 104(1) 
Discovery rule applies in situations 
where it is mandated by statute, in situa-
tions where plaintiff does not become 
aware of cause of action because of defen-
dant's concealment or misleading conduct, 
and in situations where case presents ex-
ceptional circumstances and application of 
general rule would be irrational or unjust, 
regardless of any showing that defendant 
-has prevented discovery of cause of action. 
8. Limitation of Actions <s=>43 
Ultimate determination of whether 
case presents exceptional circumstances 
that render application of statute of limita-
tions irrational or unjust turns on balanc-
ing test; court will balance hardship im-
posed on plaintiff against any prejudice to 
defendant resulting from difficulties of 
proof caused by passage of time. 
9. Limitation of Actions e ^ a d ) 
Before court reaches balancing test 
with respect to exceptional circumstances 
exception to statute of limitations, initial 
showing must be made that plaintiff did 
not know of and could not reasonably have 
known of existence of cause of action in 
time to file claim within limitation period. 
10. Limitation of Actions 3=>95(3) 
Pilot who was injured in airplane crash 
did not show that he could not have reason-
ably known about cause of action against 
city for its alleged failure to enforce ordi-
nance regulating flying clubs in time to file 
claim within statute of limitations, so that 
exceptional circumstances exception to 
statute of limitations did not apply; fact 
that airplane crashed gave pilot reasonable 
grounds to question whether city was en-
forcing ordinance, fact that pilot's counsel 
requested information from city airport 
concerning flying club's insurance ten 
months after crash indicated that pilot 
knew of requirements of ordinance well 
within one-year period for filing notice of 
claim against city, and pilot made no fur-
ther investigation beyond making unspeci-
fied number of telephone calls to airport 
within statutory period. U.C.A.1953, 63-
30-11, 63-30-13. 
11. Limitation of Actions $=>104U) 
"Concealment; version of discovery 
rule" is essentially claim of equitable estop-
pel whereby defendant who causes delay in 
bringing of cause of action is estopped 
from relying on statute of limitations as 
defense to action.. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
12. Estoppel e»59 
For equitable estoppel doctrine to be 
invoked, showing must be made that, under 
circumstances, party claiming estoppel has 
acted in reasonable manner. 
13. Limitation of Actions <3=>104(1) 
In order to invoke concealment version 
of discovery rule, it must be shown that, 
given defendant's actions, reasonable plain-
tiff would not have brought suit within 
statutory period. 
14. Limitation of Actions $=»165 
While party may be excused for failing 
to pursue claim if party acted in reasonable 
reliance on defendant's representations, ab-
sent any representations by defendant, 
plaintiff must take reasonable steps to 
prosecute claim. 
15. Limitation of Actions ®»104(2) 
Pilot injured in airplane crash who 
brought action against city alleging that 
city failed to enforce ordinances regulating 
flying clubs did not rely on representations 
made by city, so that concealment version 
of discovery rule was not applicable to toll 
statute of limitations on pilot's action; pilot 
did not take reasonable steps to investigate 
city's liability, notwithstanding his conten-
tion that city did not return his telephone 
calls in deliberate attempt to prevent him 
from discovering existence of cause of ac-
tion within statutory period. 
WARREN v. PROVO CITY CORP. 
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Wayne B. Watson, Thomas J. Scribner, 
Provo, for plaintiff and appellant. 
David C. Dixon, Gary L. Gregerson, Rob-
ert D. West, Provo, for defendants and 
appellees. 
1. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 6^-30-11 to -15. 
2. Provo's motion to dismiss did not cite any 
specific rule of civil procedure. However, both 
of the memorandums in support of and in oppo-
sition to the motion to dismiss were accompa-
nied by affidavits, and the trial court ruled that 
the complaint should be dismissed, even if War-
ren's factual assertions are presumed correct. 
We have previously treated motions to dismiss 
on the ground that the plaintiff did not timely 
file a notice of claim as motions pursuant to 
rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. See Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 628 
(Utah 1983). When affidavits or other evidence 
Charles R. Warren appeals from an order 
of the fourth district court dismissing his 
complaint. The complaint alleged that Pro-
vo City Corporation and James R. Mathis 
("Provo") are liable for injuries Warren 
sustained in the crash of an airplane leased 
from Western Flyers Flying Club, an orga-
nization regulated by Provo. The trial 
court ruled that Warren's failure to file a 
notice of claim within one year from the 
date the claim arose, as required by sec-
tions 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 of Utah's Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act, bars his claim.1 
We affirm. 
[1,2] The court dismissed the complaint 
pursuant to Provo's motion for summary 
judgment2 In an appeal from a summary 
judgment, we view the facts in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the mo-
tion.3 
In September of 1988, Warren leased an 
airplane from Western Flyers, a flying club 
with its base of operations located at Provo 
City Airport. Provo ordinance 13.03.060 
regulates flying' clubs. Specifically, the or-
dinance requires flying clubs to assure that 
their airplanes are airworthy and in compli-
ance with appropriate federal regulations. 
The ordinance also requires flying clubs to 
maintain adequate insurance and file a cer-
tificate of insurance at Provo City Airport. 
On September 10, 1988, the airplane that 
Warren leased from Western Flyers 
crashed, injuring Warren, his wife, and 
their son. Shortly thereafter, Warren ob-
tained counsel to assist him in seeking re-
covery for damages sustained in the crash. 
is presented in conjunction with a 12(b)(6) mo-
tion, the motion is generally treated as a motion 
for summary judgment, pursuant to rule 56(c) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah 
R.Civ.P. 12(c); Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 
818 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1991). Given the 
court's ruling and the fact that both parties 
submitted affidavits, we will treat the motion in 
the instant case as a motion for summary judg-
ment 
3. Culp Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 
650, 651 (Utah 1990). 
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During the months of June, July, Au-
gust, and September of 1989, Warren's 
counsel telephoned Provo City Airport man-
ager James R. Mathis, requesting informa-
tion concerning Western Flyers' insurance. 
However, Warren never reached Mathis, 
and the calls were not returned. 
On September 12,1989, one year and two 
days after the crash, Warren's counsel sent 
a letter to Mathis, requesting information 
concerning Western Flyers' insurance. On 
December 5, 1989, counsel for Provo wrote 
to Warren's counsel, advising him that Pro-
vo City Airport did not have Western 
Flyers' certificate of insurance on file and 
Western Flyers had not responded to inqui-
ries concerning whether they had main-
tained the required insurance. On March 
26, 1990, over one year and six months 
after the crash, Warren filed a notice of 
claim asserting that Provo is liable for his 
personal injuries because Provo failed to 
enforce ordinance 13.03.060. 
Provo denied the claim. Thereafter, 
Warren filed a complaint alleging that Pro-
vo is liable for his personal injuries because 
of its failure to enforce ordinance 13.03.060 
and assure that Western Flyers' airplanes 
were airworthy and adequately insured. 
Provo moved to dismiss on the ground 
that Warren had failed to file a timely 
notice of claim. Warren, through new 
counsel, argued in his memorandum in op-
position to the motion to dismiss, that the 
discovery rule should apply to excuse his 
failure to file a notice of claim because he 
did not have reasonable grounds to believe 
4. On appeal, Warren also asserls that sections 
63-30-11 and 63-30-13 violate various provi-
sions of the state and federal constitutions. In 
making this contention, he asks us to overrule 
our decisions in Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 
245, 249 (Utah 1988), and Sears v. Southworth, 
563 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1977), which uphold the 
constitutionality of the challenged sections. 
However, Warren did not raise these arguments 
with the trial court. With limited exceptions, 
our practice has been to decline consideration 
of issues raised for the first time on appeal. 
Espinal v. Salt Lake City Ba\ of Educ., 191 P.2d 
412, 413 (Utah 1990); Pratt v. City Council of 
City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 173-74 (Utah 
1981). Therefore, we do not address these 
claims. 
that Provo was not enforcing its ordinances 
until more than a year after the crash. 
Warren further alleged that Provo con-
cealed the fact that Western Flyers did not 
have adequate insurance on file in a delib-
erate attempt to prevent him from obtain-
ing incriminating information within the 
statutory period. 
The trial court dismissed the complaint, 
ruling that "plaintiffs own negligence pro-
hibited him from filing a timely notice of 
claim; however, even assuming that defen-
dants intentionally concealed [Provo's fail-
ure to require Western Flyers to file a 
certificate of insurance], such concealment 
did not prevent plaintiff from filing an ade-
quate notice of claim within the statutory 
period." 
[3,4] A single issue is properly before 
this court: Did the trial court err in grant-
ing Provo's motion for summary judgment 
on the basis that the discovery rule does 
not apply and therefore sections 63-30-11 
and 63-30-13 bar Warren's claim? 4 Sum-
mary judgment is appropriate if, viewing 
the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party, the moving party is 
nevertheless entitled! to a judgment as a 
matter of law.5 Accordingly, we review 
the trial court's decision granting a motion 
for summary judgment for correctness.6 
[5,6] The notice of claim provisions of 
sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 operate as 
a one-year statute of limitations in cases 
brought against a governmental entity.7 
Generally, a cause of action accrues and 
the relevant statute of limitations begins to 
5. Utah R.CW.P. 56(c); see also Transamerica 
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power <fr Water, Inc., 
789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990); Bonham v. Mor-
gan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). 
6. Transamerica, 789 P.2d at 25; Bonham, 788 
P.2d at 499. 
7. See, e.g„ O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs., 
821 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1991) (applying gen-
eral law dealing with statute of limitations to 
notices of claims). Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-
11 to -15 provide that in order to bring a claim 
against a governmental entity, a plaintiff must 
file a notice of claim within one year of the time 
the action arose. If the claim is denied, the 
plaintiff has one year from the denial of the 
claim to file a complaint. 
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run "upon the happening of the last event 
necessary to complete the cause of action 
. . . [and] mere ignorance of the existence 
of a cause of action does not prevent the 
running of the statute of limitations."8 
However, in certain instances, the discov-
ery rule allows for the tolling of a statute 
of limitations "until the discovery of facts 
forming the basis for the cause of action." * 
[7] This court has recognized three cir-
cumstances where the discovery rule ap-
plies: (1) in situations where the discovery 
rule is mandated by statute;10 (2) in situa-
tions where a plaintiff does not become 
aware of the cause of action because of the 
defendant's concealment or misleading con-
duct; n and (3) in situations where the case 
presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be 
irrational or unjust, regardless of any 
showing that the defendant has prevented 
the discovery of the cause of action.12 
Warren contends that both the exceptional-
circumstances and the concealment ver-
sions of the discovery rule apply to excuse 
his failure to file a timely notice of claim. 
[8-10] We turn first to Warren's excep-
tional-circumstances argument. The ulti-
mate determination of whether a case pres-
ents exceptional circumstances that render 
the application of a statute of limitations 
irrational or unjust turns on a balancing 
test13 However, before a court reaches 
this test, an initial showing must be made 
that the plaintiff did not know of and could 
not reasonably have known of the existence 
of the cause of action in time to file a claim 
within the limitation period.14 A review of 
the record reveals that Warren has not 
made this threshold showing. 
8. Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 
1981); see also O'Neal 821 P.2d at 1143. 
9. Myers, 635 P.2d at 86; see also O'Neal 821 
?2& at 1143; Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868, 
869 (Utah 1990). 
10. Eg., Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-19; Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-26; see also Myers, 635 P.2d at 86. 
11. Eg., Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 
105, 107 (Utah 1978); Rice v. Granite School 
Dist, 23 Utah 2d 22. 456 P.2d 159, 163 (1969); 
see also Myers, 635 P.2d at 86. 
The fact that the plane crashed gave 
Warren reasonable grounds to question 
whether Provo was enforcing ordinance 
13.03.060 and requiring Western Flyers to 
keep its airplanes in airworthy condition. 
Furthermore, the fact that Warren's coun-
sel phoned Provo City Airport in June of 
1989 indicates that Warren knew of the 
requirements of ordinance 13.03.060 well 
within the one-year period. However, 
though Warren knew of the ordinance and 
should have been on notice that the ordi-
nance may not have been enforced, the 
only inquiry he undertook into Provo's lia-
bility was to make an unspecified number 
of phone calls to Provo City Airport De-
spite his failure to reach the airport manag-
er, he made no further investigation within 
the statutory period. 
Clearly, Warren has not alleged any 
facts demonstrating that he undertook rea-
sonable steps to investigate Provo's liabili-
ty. Therefore, as a matter of law, Warren 
has not shown that he could not have rea-
sonably known about the cause of action in 
time to file his claim within the statutory 
period. Accordingly, the trial court was 
correct in dismissing this claim on sum-
mary judgment 
Warren's remaining contention is that 
the concealment version of the discovery 
rule applies to excuse his failure to file a 
timely notice of claim. Warren bases this 
argument on the contention that Provo did 
not return his phone calls in a deliberate 
attempt to prevent him from discovering 
the existence of a cause of action within 
the statutory period. 
[11-13] The concealment version of the 
discovery rule is essentially a claim of equi-
12. Klinger, 791 P.2d at 872; Myers, 635 P.2d at 
87. 
13. A court will balance the hardship imposed on 
the plaintiff against any prejudice to the defen-
dant resulting from "difficulties of proof caused 
by the passage of time.'* Myers, 635 P2d at 87; 
see also Klinger, 791 P.2d at 872. 
14. O'Neal, 821 P.2d at 1144; see also Atwood v. 
Sturm, Ruger 6 Co., 823 ?2d 1064, 1065 (Utah 
1992); Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. 
Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 1987). 
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table estoppel, whereby a defendant who 
causes a delay in the bringing of a cause of 
action is estopped from relying on the stat-
ute of limitations as a defense to the ac-
tion.15 As is true in all cases of equitable 
estoppel, for the doctrine to be invoked a 
showing must be made that, under the 
circumstances, the party claiming estoppel 
has acted in a reasonable manner.16 There-
fore, in order to invoke the concealment 
version of the discovery rule it must be 
shown that given the defendant's actions, a 
reasonable plaintiff would not have 
brought suit within the statutory period.17 
Accordingly, we have held that summary 
judgment is inappropriate despite the fail-
ure to file a timely notice of claim or com-
plaint when a plaintiff alleged that an 
agent for the state assured her that she 
would be fully compensated as soon as her 
medical costs were ascertained;18 when a 
plaintiff alleged that an agent for the state 
erroneously told him that a runoff culvert 
could not possibly have caused the water 
damage on his property;1* and when a 
plaintiff alleged that an agent for the state 
erroneously told her that the person driv-
ing an automobile that collided with her 
was not an employee of the state.20 
However, we have upheld summary judg-
ments because of a failure to file a timely 
notice of claim or complaint when a plain-
tiff who was aware of the statute and 
represented by counsel alleged only that 
the defendant lulled him into "a false sense 
15. Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218, 220 (Utah 
1989); Rice, 456 P.2d at 161-64. 
16. See CECO v. Concrete Specialists Inc., 772 
P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989), wherein we stated 
that estoppel requires proof of "reasonable ac-
tion or inaction by the other party taken or not 
taken on the basis of the first party's statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act." Id. (emphasis 
added). See also Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d 
1151, 1155 (Utah 1981), wherein we stated, MA 
party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on repre-
sentations or acts . . . if he had the means by 
which with reasonable diligence he could ascer-
tain the true situation." Id (emphasis added). 
See also Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Fraud, 
Misrepresentation, or Deception as Estopping Re-
liance on Statute of Limitations, 43 A.L.R.3d 
429, 443 (1972); Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, 
Promise to Settle or Perform as Estopping Reli-
ance on Statute of Limitations, 44 A.L.R.3d 482, 
of security [regarding the possibility of a 
settlement] by requesting medical informa-
tion about [his] physical condition"21 and 
when a plaintiff alleged that an agent for 
the state gave him erroneous information 
regarding the governmental entity respon-
sible for a strip of highway at issue but the 
court concluded that the failure to file a 
notice of claim was caused by the plain-
tiffs own "inadvertence."22 
[14,15] In the instant case, Warren 
does not allege that he relied on any repre-
sentation made by Provo. Ratiier, he 
claims that he was prevented from discov-
ering the cause of action because F*rovo did 
not return his phone calls. However, as 
discussed above, Warren did not take rea-
sonable steps to investigate Provo's liabili-
ty. While a party may be excused for 
failing to pursue a claim if the party acted 
in reasonable reliance on a defendant's rep-
resentations, absent any representations by 
the defendant, a plaintiff must take reason-
able steps to prosecute the claim. Other-
wise, there can be no showing ithat the 
defendant's actions prevented the discovery 
of the cause of action. 
Because Warren has not alleged any 
facts that demonstrate that he took reason-
able steps to pursue his claim or that he 
reasonably relied on a representation made 
by Provo, the concealment version of the 
discovery rule is not applicable to the in-
stant case. Therefore, the trial court was 
488 (1972); Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Plain-
tiff's Diligence as Affecting His Right to have 
Defendant Estopped From Pleading the Statute 
of Limitations, 44 AXJUd 760, 768 (1972). 
17. See generally 43 AX.R.3d at 443; 44 A.L.R.3d 
at 488; 44 A.L.R.3d at 768 and cases cited there-
in. 
18. Rice, 456 P.2d at 161-64. 
19. Vincent, 583 ?2d at 106-07. 
20. Forsman, 779 ?2d at 220. 
21. Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925, 926 (Utah 
1977). 
22. Varoz v. Sevey, 506 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 
1973). 
GRAMLICH 
Cite a« 838 V2d 
also correct in granting summary judgment 
on that ground. 
Affirmed. 
HOWE, Associate CJ., and STEWART, 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
f KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
Dana GRAMLICH, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
Jay P. MUNSEY, M.D., Richard Home, 
D.C., and Moab Family Chiropractic 
Clinic, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 900466. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
v. MUNSEY Utah 1131 
1131 (Utah 1992) 
1. Physicians and Surgeons <s=»17.5 
Medical malpractice action was not 
barred due to plaintiffs failure to file re-
quest for prelitigation review within 60 
days of original notice of intent to com-
mence action, where original notice of in-
tent to commence action was served within 
90 days of expiration of statute of limita-
tions thereby entitling plaintiff to addition-
al 120-day extension, and plaintiff filed 
second notice of intent within newly en-
larged limitations period followed promptly 
by second request for prelitigatdon review. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-14-2, 78-14-4(1), 78-14-8, 
78-14-12, 78-14-12(l)(c), (2, 3). 
2. Physicians and Surgeons <s=»17.5 
Medical malpractice plaintiffs failure 
to file her request for prelitigation review 
within 60 days of original notice of intent 
to commence action did not render original 
notice invalid so as to preclude plaintiff 
from extending the limitations period by 
120 days. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-2, 78-14-4(1), 
78-14-8, 78-14-12, 78-14-12(l)(c), (2, 3). 
Sept. 23, 1992. 
In medical malpractice action, the Sev-
enth District Court, Grand County, Boyd 
Bunnell, J., dismissed complaint on defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment 
based upon plaintiffs failure to meet 60-
day deadline for filing request for prelitiga-
tion panel review after serving notice of 
intent to commence action on defendant. 
Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Durham, J., held that plaintiffs failure to 
file request for prelitigation review within 
60 days of original notice of intent to com-
mence action did not bar action since origi-
nal notice was served within 90 days of 
expiration of statute of limitations entitling 
plaintiff to additional 120 days to file her 
action and plaintiff filed second notice and 
promptly made second request for preliti-
gation review within newly enlarged limita-
tions period. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Zimmerman, J., dissented. 
Don R. Petersen, Leslie W. Slaugh, Pro-
vo, for Gramlich. 
Elliott J. Williams, David W. Slagle, Eliz-
abeth King, Salt Lake City, for Munsey. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Plaintiff Dana Gramlich appeals from a 
summary judgment dismissing her mal-
practice action for failure to comply in a 
timely manner with the prelitigation review 
requirements of the Utah Health Care Mal-
practice Act ("the Act"). Because we do 
not find that a failure to initiate prelitiga-
tion review within 60 days of serving a 
notice of intent to commence an action 
("notice") is a jurisdictional bar, we re-
verse. 
In reviewing motions for summary judg-
ment, we view the facts in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. D & L 
Supply v. Saurini 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 
1989). We state the facts accordingly. 
In March and October of 1985, Ms. 
Gramlich consulted defendant Dr. Jay P. 
Munsey, complaining of a numbness on the 
ADDENDUM 
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Klinger vs. Kightlv 
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Robert B. KLINGER and Karol J. 
Klinger, Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
Eugene E. RIGHTLY, Helen L. Rightly, 
Harry D. Rreis, Peggy R. Kreis Barnett, 
United Farm Agency, Inc., and Gerald 
W. Wilkerson, Defendants and Appel-
lants. 
Eugene E. RIGHTLY, Helen L. Rightly, 
Harry D. Rreis, Peggy R. Rreis 
Barnett, Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Glen H. CALDER and John Doe Wilson, 
individually and dba Wilson & Calder, 
Third-Party Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 880003. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 22, 1990. 
After they were sued for rescission 
based on mutual mistake, property vendors 
asserted third-party claim against surveyor 
for negligence. The Seventh District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Dennis L. Dra-
ney, J., dismissed third-party complaint, 
and vendors appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Hall, CJ., held that "discovery rule" 
applied to surveyor negligence statute of 
limitations. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Howe, Associate C.J., concurred and 
filed opinion. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
1. Judgment <3=»181(2, S) 
Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when no genuine issues of material fact 
exist and moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. 
2. Limitation of Actions <§=>95(1) 
Under "discovery rule," cause of ac-
tion does not accrue and statute of limita-
tions does not begin to run until plaintiff 
learns of, or, in exercise of reasonable dil-
igence, should have learned of, facts which 
give rise to cause of action; rule functions 
as exception to normal application of stat-
ute of limitations. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3 Limitation of Actions <3=>199(1) 
Whether discovery rule applies to 
cause of action and its statute of limita-
tions is question of law and not of fact. 
4. Judgment <s=»181(2) 
Questions of law may be disposed of 
through summary judgment if there are no 
outstanding questions of material fact to 
be discerned by the trier of fact. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
5. Limitation of Actions ®=>96(2), 100(1) 
Statute under which limitations period 
governing actions for relief on grounds of 
fraud or mistake does not accrue until dis-
covery of facts constituting fraud or mis-
take did not apply to property vendors' 
negligence cause of action against survey-
or. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-26(3). 
6. Limitation of Actions <£=>95(3) 
"Discovery rule" applied to statute of 
limitations governing property vendors1 
negligence cause of action against survey-
or; action would be completely barred if 
rule was not applied, and evidence pertain-
ing to performance of survey was not so 
stale as to preclude proper defense. 
Ephraim H. Frankhauser, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants and appellants. 
Rick J. Sutherland, Robert F. Babcock, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellees. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
This case is on appeal from the Seventh 
District Court, Duchesne County. The trial 
court found for plaintiffs and rescinded a 
land purchase contract based upon mutual 
mistake. Defendants were allowed to 
bring a third-party complaint against the 
surveyor of the property, Glen H. Calder, 
John Doe Wilson, and Wilson & Calder 
(hereinafter "Calder"), who were eventual-
ly granted a summary judgment dismissal 
on the basis that the statute of limitation 
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had run for a claim against the surveyor of 
the land pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-25(2) (1987). We reverse the trial 
court's ruling of summary judgment with 
regard to the Kightlys' third-party com-
plaint against Calder. 
FACTS 
In June 1971, defendants purchased a 
parcel of unimproved real property located 
in Duchesne County, Utah, from Strawber-
ry River Estates (hereinafter "Strawber-
ry") by uniform real estate contract. After 
the purchase, defendants hired Wilson & 
Calder to survey the property, and on May 
15, 1972, defendants received a certificate 
of survey signed by Glen H. Calder, certify-
ing the location and dimensions of the prop-
erty and that there were no encroachments 
on it. 
Defendants used the property for camp-
ing and other recreational purposes be-
tween 1971 and 1983. On July 23, 1983, 
they sold the property to the Klingers by a 
warranty deed containing the description in 
the warranty deed from Strawberry to de-
fendants and confirmed in the certificate of 
survey obtained from Calder. 
In February 1985, the Klingers discover-
ed a discrepancy in the boundaries of the 
property. The Klingers brought suit 
against defendants for fraud and misrepre-
sentation but later amended their complaint 
to a cause of action for mutual mistake. 
Defendants were granted leave from the 
trial court to file a third-party complaint 
against Calder for negligence in conducting 
the survey. 
The trial court granted a rescission of 
the sale contract from defendants to the 
Klingers and a summary judgment dismis-
sal to Calder on the basis that the statute 
of limitation had run against defendants' 
third-party cause of action pursuant to 
1. Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah 
Power & Light Co., lib P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 
1989); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 
P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986). 
2. Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Con-
struction Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1373-74 (Utah 
1987); Hudesman v. Meriwether Leachman As-
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2) (1987). De-
fendants obtained a settlement with the 
Klingers subsequent to trial and before 
appeal; therefore, the only issues on ap-
peal are (1) whether the trial court properly 
used summary judgment to dismiss the 
third-party claim, and (2) whether the trial 
court should have applied the discovery 
rule to toll the statute of limitation with 
regard to defendants' third-party claim 
against Calder. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
[1] Defendants' first contention is that 
the trial court erroneously granted summa-
ry judgment to Calder because defendants' 
reliance upon the "discovery rule" raised 
an issue of fact that could not properly be 
disposed of through summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when no genuine issues of material fact 
exist and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.1 The issue is 
whether the application of the discovery 
rule is a question of law or of fact. 
[2,3] The discovery rule determines 
when a cause of action accrues in certain 
actions. Under the discovery rule, a cause 
of action does not accrue and the statute of 
limitation does not begin to run until the 
plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have learned of 
the facts which give rise to the cause of 
action.2 The discovery rule functions as an 
exception to the normal application of a 
statute of limitation.3 Whether the dis-
covery rule applies to a cause of action is, 
like the statute of limitation, a question of 
law, not of fact. 
[41 Questions of law may be disposed of 
through summary judgment if there are no 
outstanding questions of material fact to 
sociates, Inc, 35 Wash.App. 318, 321, 666 P.2d 
937, 940 (1983); Metropolitan Services, Inc. v. 
Spokane, 32 Wash.App. 714, 720, 649 P.2d 642, 
646 (1982). 
3. See generally Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 
668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983); Myers v. McDonald, 
635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981). 
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be discerned by the trier of fact.4 Defen-
dants' assertion that questions of fact ex-
isted with regard to whether the discovery 
rule should be applied to toll the applicable 
statute of limitation is erroneous. The trial 
court was therefore correct in ruling as a 
matter of law on the issue of whether the 
discovery rule should be applied to the ap-
plicable statute of limitation. 
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATION 
[5] Defendants' third-party complaint 
states a cause of action for "negligence 
and failure of third-party defendants to 
properly survey and locate the subject 
property for survey." Defendants assert 
that their complaint states a cause of ac-
tion in negligence, and yet they cite Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) (1987), which 
states, "Within three years: . . . (3) an ac-
tion for relief on the ground of fraud or 
mistake; except that the cause of action in 
such case does not accrue until the dis-
covery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake." 
Section 78-12-26(3) and actions alleging 
fraud or mistake are usually based on a 
contract, not a negligence, cause of action. 
Indeed, Utah case law reveals that this 
4. Utah R-Civ.P. 56(c). 
5. See Bench v. Pace, 538 P.2d 180 (Utah 1975); 
Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 
684 (1916). 
6. Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown 
and Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59-60 (Utah 
1986). 
7. The trial court applied Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-25(2), which states, "Within four years: 
. . . (2) an action for relief not otherwise provid-
ed for by law." The trial court found that a 
cause of action for surveyor negligence did not 
fall specifically under any existing Utah statute. 
We note that subsequent to the filing of this 
action, the Utah legislature amended Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (Supp.1989) and created sub-
section (l)(b), which states: 'In an action re-
garding property boundary surveys, the seven-
year time period commences when the property 
survey is either recorded in the county record-
er's office or filed in the county surveyor's office 
under Section 17-23-17." 
8. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
section has been applied only to the refor-
mation of contracts,5 not to actions in negli-
gence. We hold that section 78-12-26(3) is 
inapplicable to defendants' cause of action. 
We note that Utah recognizes the theory 
of "negligent misrepresentation" with re-
gard to surveyors.6 No matter how the 
cause of action is characterized, whether in 
tort or contract, it would lapse under any 
other Utah statute of limitation without 
application of the discovery rule. 
DISCOVERY RULE 
[6] Defendants' second contention is 
that the trial court erred in refusing to 
apply the discovery rule to the statute of 
limitation applicable to their cause of action 
for surveyor negligence.7 Because the is-
sue of whether the discovery rule applies to 
toll the statute of limitation is a question of 
law, we need show no deference to the trial 
court's ruling on appeal, but we review it 
for correctness.8 
Observing how the discovery rule is ap-
plied nationally to the issue of surveyor 
negligence or breach of contract does not 
indicate any dispositive national trend. A 
number of jurisdictions have applied the 
discovery rule to surveyor negligence,9 
9. See Cristich v. Allen Engineering, Inc., 458 
So.2d 76 (Fla.App.1984) (discovery rule implied 
where court did not apply the statute of limita-
tion for surveyor negligence until the error had 
been discovered as directed by the statute); Roz-
ny v. Marnul, 43 I11.2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969) 
(where the facts and statute are essentially on 
point with the present case, the court found that 
the discovery rule applied) (as modified on de-
nial of rehearing); Raff el v. Perley, 14 Mass.App. 
242, 437 N.E.2d 1082 (1982) (trial court's dismis-
sal reversed on grounds that plaintiff should 
have been able to present evidence that claims 
for relief did not accrue until plaintiff discover-
ed error in survey); E.A. Williams, Inc. v. Russo 
Development Corp., 82 N.J. 160, 411 A.2d 697 
(1980) (where survey was performed in 1954, 
cause of action did not accrue until plaintiff 
discovered error in 1972); New Market Poultry 
Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 NJ. 419, 241 A.2d 633 
(1968) (court held that discovery rule applied 
where surveyor conducted an erroneous survey 
in 1952 that was not discovered until 1963); 
Hudesman v. Meriwether Leachman Associates, 
Inc., 35 Wash.App. 318, 666 P.2d 937 (1983) 
(confirming discovery rule for surveyor negli-
gence established in Kundahl); Kundahl v. Bar-
nett, 5 Wash.App. 227, 486 P.2d 1164 (1971) 
KLINGER v. KIGHTLY 
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while others have rejected it.10 Legislative 
enactments are even more widespread.11 
Some arguments in favor of applying the 
discovery rule to cases of surveyor negli-
gence include the following: (1) an innocent 
reliant party should not carry the burden 
of a surveyor's professional mistakes;12 (2) 
"recovery . . . by a reliant user whose ulti-
mate use was foreseeable will promote cau-
tionary techiques [sic] among survey-
ors";13 (3) "[t]he passage of time does not 
entail the danger of a fraudulent, false, 
frivolous, speculative or uncertain 
claim Further, under the said facts it 
does not appear possible that by reason of 
the passage of time [the] defendant's testi-
monial proof of a defense would be made 
more difficult"; u (4) it is illogical to re-
faction against land surveyor for negligence in 
making survey did not accrue until injured par-
ty discovered or had reasonable grounds to dis-
cover error in survey). 
10. See Lembert v. Gilmore, 312 A.2d 335 (Del.Su-
per.1973) (court viewed cause of action as one 
in contract and held that cause accrued when 
contract was breached, i.e., when the stakes 
were erroneously placed by the surveyor); How-
ell v. Betts, 211 Tenn. 134, 362 S.W.2d 924 (1962) 
(where survey was performed in 1934 and error 
was discovered in 1958, court found time too 
remote to hold a surveyor liable). 
11. See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 16-56-112 (1987) (five-
year statute of limitation from substantial com-
pletion of the project); Cal.Civ.P.Code §§ 337.-
1(a), 337.15(a) (West 1982) (section 337.1(a)— 
four-year patent survey defect; section 337.15(a) 
—ten-year latent survey defect); Colo.Rev.Stat. 
§ 13-80-105 (1987) (within three years after dis-
covery, ten-year statute of repose); Del.Code 
Ann. tit. 10 § 8122 (1974) (to mark and bound 
lands, seven years from the date of return of 
commissions); Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, fl13-222 
(1984) (four years from the date plaintiff knew 
or should have known of the erroneous survey); 
Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 5-112 (1989) 
(three years after discovery or twenty-year stat-
ute of repose, whichever occurs first); Mich. 
Comp.Laws § 600.5838 (1987) (accrues when 
professional relationship ends or must be 
brought within six months of discovery); Minn. 
Stat. § 541.052 (1988) (two years after discovery 
or ten-year statute of repose, whichever occurs 
first); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.098 (1986) (five years 
after date of discovery of surveyor negligence); 
Mont.Code Ann. § 27-2-208 (1988) (ten years 
after completion of the project but may be ap-
plicable only to projects for construction or 
improvements); Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.135 (1987) 
(ten years after completion but may be applica-
quire the plaintiff to hire two or three 
surveyors to assure that the first survey is 
correct;,5 (5) strict application of the stat-
ute of limitation would be unjust;,6 and (6) 
the plaintiff lacks the means or ability to 
ascertain that a wrong has been commit-
ted.17 
Arguments in opposition to application of 
the discovery rule in surveyor negligence 
cases include (1) "the onerousness of poten-
tial liability continuing throughout one's 
professional life, the prejudice wrought by 
the passage of time not only in terms of 
defending against claims but also in factu-
ally ascertaining the true cause or causes 
of injuries";18 and (2) "mere ignorance of 
the existence of a cause of action does not 
prevent the running of the statute of limi-
ble to projects for construction or improve-
ments only); Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 42, § 5537 (Pur-
don 1981 & Supp.1989) (four years from date of 
discovery but in no event later than twenty-one 
years); Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-114 (1980) (four 
years from the date survey is recorded on plat); 
Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.011 (Ver-
non Supp.1990) (ten years after the date survey 
is complete); Wash.Rev.Code § 4.16.310 (1989) 
(six years after completion but may be limited 
to improvements and construction); W.Va.Code 
§ 55-2-6a (1981 & Supp.1989) (ten years after 
owner accepts or occupies, but may be limited 
to improvements and construction only); Wis. 
Stat. § 893.37 (1987-1988) (six years after com-
pletion of the survey). 
12. Rozny, 250 N.E.2d at 663. 
13. Id 
14. New Market Poultry Farms, 241 A.2d at 636. 
15. Kundahl, 486 P.2d at 1167. 
16. Id; see abo EA. Williams, Inc., 411 A.2d at 
700; Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah 
1981). 
17. Hudesman, 666 P.2d at 940 (citing U.S. Oil & 
Refining Co. v. Department of Ecology, 96 
Wash.2d 85, 92, 633 P.2d 1329, 1334 (1981)); see 
also Myers, 635 P.2d at 87. 
18. EA. Williams, Inc., 411 A.2d at 701; see also 
Howell, 362 S.W.2d at 926 (citing Ultramares 
Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 
(1931)); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 
P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983) (quoting Order of 
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agen-
cy, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 
88 L.Ed. 788 (1944)); Myers, 635 P.2d at 87. 
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tations." ,9 
Because compelling arguments exist on 
both sides regarding the applicability or 
inapplicability of the discovery rule, we 
must seek a way to balance the interests of 
each party. In Myers, we listed three cir-
cumstances under which the discovery rule 
should be applied and we adopted a bal-
ancing test for application of the rule. The 
three circumstances set out in Myers 
whereby this Court will apply the discovery 
rule are where (1) the legislature has 
adopted the discovery rule by statute; (2) 
there is proof of concealment or misleading 
by the defendant; and (3) application of the 
general statute of limitation rule would be 
irrational or unjust.20 Defendants do not 
assert either of the first two parts of the 
test, but they do seek an equitable ruling 
as to whether the application of the dis-
covery rule would prevent an irrational or 
unjust result. 
In Myers, we applied the balancing test 
to evaluate whether the application of the 
discovery rule would be irrational or un-
just The plaintiffs in Myers were guardi-
ans of a minor who was killed in an auto-
mobile accident. However, they were un-
able to discover that the victim was their 
ward until after the statute of limitation 
for wrongful death had run. We held that 
the discovery rule should be applied where 
"[t]he hardship the statute of limitations 
would impose on the plaintiff in the circum-
stances of [the] case outweighed any preju-
dice to the defendant from difficulties of 
proof caused by the passage of time/'21 
This balancing test is a question of law.22 
Applying the balancing test to the 
present case, we find the obvious prejudice 
to defendants is that without application of 
the discovery rule, their cause of action is 
completely barred regardless of whether 
their complaint is in contract or in tort. 
This is so despite the fact that there are no 
equities that weigh against them. They 
had no reason to suspect that the survey 
was inaccurate, nor did they refrain from 
19. Myers, 635 P.2d at 86 (citing Baker v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 39 Cal.App.3d 315, 114 Cal.Rptr. 
171 (1974)). 
doing anything that might reasonably have 
been expected of them that could have dis-
closed the error. On the other hand, the 
prejudice to defendants is that the record 
reflects that no survey records or notes are 
available after fourteen years and, presum-
ably, the memories of the members of the 
survey party have dimmed. The only exist-
ing record of the survey is the survey 
certificate signed by third-party defendant 
Glen H. Calder that specifies the bound-
aries of the property. While the record 
reflects that Calder himself may not have 
been a member of the survey party, as 
signor on the survey certificate he is re-
sponsible for its content, is still actively 
engaged in the practice of surveying, and is 
available for testimony. 
Utilizing the balancing test and being 
conscious of the purposes of statutes of 
limitation, we hold that under the facts of 
this case the evidence is not so stale or 
remote as to outweigh the prejudice to 
defendants of having their claim barred by 
the statute of limitation. The discovery 
rule should be applied to the statute of 
limitation for surveyor negligence under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2). 
The ruling of the trial court in favor of 
summary judgment for third-party defen-
dants is reversed, and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with our 
decision. 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
(concurring) 
I concur but write to observe that the 
application of the discovery rule here is 
consistent with the application of the dis-
covery rule in a case of alleged medical 
malpractice, Christiansen v. Rees. 20 Utah 
2d 199, 436 P.2d 435 (1968) (broken surgical 
needle left in body). Since that decision, 
the legislature has enacted Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-4, shortening the period in which a 
21. Id at 87. 
22. Id. 
20. Id at 86. 
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malpractice action may be brought against 
a health care provider to two years (subject 
to exceptions) after the patient discovers, 
or should discover, his injury, but not to 
exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect, or occur-
rence. No similar enactment has been 
made by the legislature with regard to 
alleged surveyor malpractice such as we 
are confronted with in the instant case. 
Thus the discovery rule adopted in Chris-
tiansen v. Rees would seem to be applica-
ble here. Our action is also consistent with 
the application of the discovery rule in a 
legal malpractice action decided recently by 
our Court of Appeals, Merkley v. Beaslin, 
778 P.2d 16 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Robert DUNN, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Gerald L. COOK, Warden, Utah State 
Prison, State of Utah, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 880067. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 2, 1990. 
Defendant appealed after he was con-
victed of aggravated kidnapping and sec-
ond-degree murder. The Supreme Court, 
646 P.2d 709, granted defense counsel's 
request to withdraw. Defendant sought 
writ of habeas corpus. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Michael R. Mur-
phy, J., dismissed petition without hearing, 
and defendant appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) defense 
counsel's Anders brief was inadequate as 
matter of law and showed that defendant 
received ineffective assistance of counsel 
on appeal, and (2) prior appeal was not a 
bar to habeas proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Zimmerman, J., concurred in result and 
filed opinion in which Hall, CJ., joined. 
Howe, Associate CJ., concurred in re-
sult. 
1. Double Jeopardy 3=*112 
Defendant who was convicted of sec-
ond-degree murder and aggravated kidnap-
ping and sentenced to life imprisonment 
could not have been sentenced to death at 
retrial. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-405. 
2. Judgment <s=*751 
Doctrines of waiver and res judicata do 
not stand as unyielding bar to litigation of 
claims that either once were or could have 
been litigated in prior proceeding if relit-
igation is necessary to vindicate constitu-
tional right to fair trial, despite defaults of 
defendant's attorney. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 6. 
3. Habeas Corpus ^=287 
Existence of prior appellate proceed-
ings does not ipso facto bar subsequent 
habeas corpus proceedings. 
4. Habeas Corpus <§=>447 
To be entitled to writ of habeas corpus 
petitioner must show obvious injustice or 
substantial and prejudicial denial of consti-
tutional right. 
5. Criminal Law <®=>1077.3 
Defendant's direct appeal presented by 
counsel in form of Anders brief did not 
meet standards necessary to provide effec-
tive assistance of counsel on appeal; brief 
merely recited prosecution and defense evi-
dence and stated each of four issues as 
single short sentence, brief presented no 
argument, brief listed cases but did not 
state case facts, and only two of four stat-
ed issues contained citations to any part of 
record. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
6. Criminal Law <s=>1077.3 
In order to present sufficient Anders 
brief, arguments must be sufficiently artic-
ulated to justify conclusion that counsel 
has truly sought to present meritorious 
issues but cannot; it is not enough to list 
ADDENDUM 
3. 
Meyers vs. McDonald 
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disturbed when they are based on substan-
tial, competent, admissible evidence. Fish-
er v. Taylor, Utah, 572 P.2d 393 (1977); 
Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Guthrie, 123 Utah 
172, 256 P.2d 706 (1953). 
[2] The record discloses substantial evi-
dence in support of the findings and judg-
ment of the district court. The bulk of the 
evidence at trial came from the testimony 
of the officers of Car Doctor and from 
Belmont and Olinyk. The testimony was in 
sharp conflict; however, as to the five con-
ditions listed in the March 4, 1977, agree-
ment, the record supports the finding that 
none was completed. Since the agreement 
stated that the partnership agreement 
"shall not become effective until the follow-
ing conditions have been met," the trial 
court properly concluded that no partner-
ship came into existence. 
[3] As to the estoppel issue, defendants 
argue that pursuant to § 4S-1-13, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953), as amended, a partner-
ship by estoppel was established.1 We need 
not decide whether the doctrine of partner-
ship by estoppel can ever be applied be-
tween putative partners, since there is 
nothing in the record to indicate, nor did 
the lower court find, that plaintiffs actions 
in this case were either inconsistent with or 
sufficient to nullify the outstanding condi-
tions of the written agreement. Rather, 
the conduct of plaintiff through its officers 
at all times remained subject to the agree-
ment which specified when the partnership 
would come into existence. 
It follows that judgment was properly 
rendered in favor of the plaintiff on its 
claim, and against defendants on their 
counterclaim. 
The judgment is affirmed. Costs to Re-
spondent 
HALL, C. J., and HOWE and OAKS, JJ., 
concur. 
MAUGHAN, J., heard the arguments but 
died before the opinion was filed. 
1. That section provides in pertinent part: 
When a person by words spoken or written 
or by conduct represents himself, or consents 
to another's representing him, to anyone as a 
'partner, in an existing partnership or with 
Robert MYERS and Jackie Myers, his 
wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Reggie McDONALD, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 17046. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 11, 1981. 
Guardian of 14-year-old ward killed in 
automobile accident appealed from order of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Bryant H. Croft, J., dismissing their wrong-
ful death action as barred by statute of 
limitations./The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., 
held that policy against stale claims was 
outweighed by unique circumstances of 
guardians' hardship; therefore, it was im-
proper for trial court to dismiss guardians' 
action on pleadings on basis of statute of 
limitations. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Howe, J., filed concurring opinion. 
1. Limitation of Actions <*=»! 
Statutes of limitations are designed to 
promote justice by preventing surprise 
through revival of claims that have been 
allowed to slumber until evidence has been 
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses 
have disappeared. 
2. Limitation of Actions $=»95(1) 
Mere ignorance of existence of cause of 
action does not prevent running of statute 
of limitations. 
3. Death <s=>39 
Limitation of Actions <s=>95(l) 
Where guardians had no knowledge of 
their ward's death in automobile accident 
one or more persons not actual partners, he 
is liable to any such person to whom such 
representation has been made who has on 
the faith of such representation given credit 
to the actual or apparent partnership. .. . 
MYERS v. MCDONALD 
Qte as, Utah, 635 P.2d 84 
Utah 85 
and therefore no knowledge that cause of 
action existed until after two-year limita-
tion period had expired, and guardians 
could not file action for damages or even 
initiate investigative efforts to determine 
cause of death of which they had no 
knowledge, policy against stale claims was 
outweighed by unique circumstances of 
guardians' hardship; therefore, trial court 
improperly dismissed guardians' action on 
pleadings on basis of statute of limitations. 
U.CA.1953, 78-12-28. 
Anthony M. Thurber, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs and appellants. 
Nelson L. Hayes, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
OAKS, Justice: 
The issue on this appeal is the application 
of our two-year statute of limitations for a 
wrongful death action, U.C.A., 1953, § 78-
12-28, to a case where the plaintiffs were 
unaware of the fact and circumstances of 
their decedent's death until after the statu-
tory period. The district court dismissed 
the complaint as barred by the statute of 
limitations. We reverse. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, the facts are as follows.1 Plain-
tiffs, husband and wife, were guardians of 
14-year-old Bobbie Menzies, the wife's 
brother. When Bobbie failed to return 
home after leaving with some friends, 
plaintiffs reported his disappearance to the 
police. Because he was a minor, the police 
department listed him as a runaway rather 
than as a missing person, which would have 
resulted in an automatic check of the local 
morgue. 
1. In determining the correctness of a judgment 
of dismissal, we view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. Davis v. Payne and 
Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337 (1960); 
Williams v. Z.C.M.I.. 6 Utah 2d 283. 312 P.2d 
564 (1957). Under that rule, we need not re-
solve the puzzling inconsistencies in this rec-
ord. Thus, plaintiffs' affidavit shows the date 
During the year following Bobbie's disap-
pearance, plaintiffs made "at least several 
dozen" contacts with the police in futile 
attempts to determine Bobbie's where-
abouts. Plaintiffs also read newspaper ar-
ticles concerning a Nov. 22, 1976, automo-
bile accident in Salt Lake County in which a 
car went out of control and collided with a 
large tree. That accident resulted in the 
death of a mysterious passenger, who was 
identified by the driver of the vehicle only 
as "Joey." Because that victim was de-
scribed as being 5 feet 8 inches tall, brown 
haired, and in his "early twenties," whereas 
Bobbie was 6 feet 2 inches tall, blonde, and 
14 years of age, plaintiffs did not identify 
Bobbie as the victim at that time. 
In July, 1979, a police detective contacted 
plaintiffs as part of a routine follow-up. In 
response to plaintiffs' queries, he told them 
that the mysterious accident victim had not 
yet been identified. Plaintiffs subsequently 
went to the morgue and identified the acci-
dent victim as their ward, Bobbie. On Oc-
tober 29, 1979, almost three years after the 
fatal accident, but only three months after 
their identification of the body of their 
ward, plaintiffs brought this wrongful 
death action against defendant, driver of 
the accident vehicle, alleging intoxication 
and/or willful misconduct. 
Though this action was admittedly 
brought over two years after Bobbie Men-
zies' death, plaintiffs argue that it should 
not be barred by the statute of limitations, 
since they had no knowledge of the death of 
their ward within that period. They argue 
(1) that the causes of action should not ac-
crue until plaintiffs discovered the death— 
the so-called "discovery rule"—or (2) that 
defendant should be precluded from relying 
on the statute because his erroneous report-
ing of the decedent's name as "Joey" misled 
plaintiffs and prevented them from insti-
of their ward's disappearance as Dec 22, 1977, 
which is over a year after the date of death 
alleged in the complaint. Whether this incon-
sistency and others appearing in the record are 
evidence of factual inconsistencies or merely 
typographical errors is a matter that wiU be 
determined on remand. 
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tuting their action in timely fashion.2 We 
reverse on the first ground; the second 
ground may be an issue on remand. 
[1,2] The governing policy in this area, 
as declared by the United States Supreme 
Court, is that statutes of limitations "are 
designed to promote justice by preventing 
surprises through the revival of claims that 
have been allowed to slumber until evidence 
has been lost, memories have faded; and 
witnesses have disappeared." Order of 
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express 
Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.Ct. 
582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944). In further-
ance of that policy, the general rule is that 
a cause of action accrues upon the happen-
ing of the last event necessary to complete 
the cause of action.3 Under that rule, mere 
ignorance of the existence of a cause of 
action does not prevent the running of the 
statute of limitations.4 
There are a number of exceptions to this 
general rule. In some enumerated areas of 
2. This case does not involve the kind of disabil-
ity where the legislature has provided for a 
tolling of the statute of limitations. U.C.A., 
1953, §§ 78-12-21, 78-12-36 (minority, insani-
ty, imprisonment); § 78-12-35 (absence from 
state); § 78-12-39 (war). Some of these stat-
utes have been applied to wrongful death ac-
tions. Switzer v. Reynolds, Utah, 606 P.2d 244 
(1980); Seeley v. Cowley, 12 Utah 2d 252, 365 
P.2d 63 (1961); Platz v. International Smelting 
Co., 61 Utah 342, 213 P. 187 (1922). 
3. Getz v. Bruch, 400 F.Supp. 1033 (E.D.Pa. 
1975) (illegal arrest); Knudson v. Weeks, 394 
F.Supp. 963 (W.D.Okl.1975) (surveyor's and 
home builder's negligence); Brown v. Chicago, 
Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 212 F.Supp. 832 
(W.D.Mo.1963) (libel); Jackson v. American 
Credit Bureau, Inc., 23 Ariz.App. 199, 531 P.2d 
932 (1975) (conversion); Tom Olesker's Excit-
ing World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc., 16 IU.App.3d 709, 306 N.E2d 549 (1973) 
(libel); Murphy v. Country House, Inc., 307 
Minn. 344, 240 N.W.2d 507 (1976) (inadequate 
consideration for stock transfer); Bowling v. 
S.S. Kresge Co., Mo., 431 S.W.2d 191 (1968) 
(unauthorized stock transfer); Davis v. State, 
84 Misc.2d 597, 377 N.Y.S.2d 385 (N.Y.Ct.Cl. 
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 54 A.D.2d 126, 
388 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1976) (damages for wrongful 
release of confidential information); Sosnow v. 
Paul, 43 A.D.2d 978, 352 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1974), 
affd 36 N.Y.2d 780, 369 N.Y.S.2d 693, 330 
N.E.2d 643 (1975) (architect's malpractice); 
Shipp v. O'Dowd, 454 S.W.2d 845 (Tex.Civ. 
App.l970) (breach of contract); Denzer v. 
the law, our Legislature has adopted the 
discovery rule by statute so that the limita-
tions period does not begin to run until the 
discovery of facts forming the basis for the 
cause of action.5 In other circumstances, 
where the statute of limitations would nor-
mally apply, this Court has held that proof 
of concealment or misleading by the de-
fendant precludes the defendant from rely-
ing on the statute of limitations.6 This is 
plaintiffs' second theory in this case. Final-
ly, without regard to proof of wrongdoing 
on the part of the defendant, the courts of 
some states have adopted the discovery rule 
by judicial action as to exceptional circum-
stances or causes of action where the appli-
cation of the general rule would be irration-
al or unjust.7 Those precedents point the 
way toward what we deem to be the appro-
priate decision in this case. 
[3] Here, it is alleged that despite their 
efforts to discover his whereabouts plain-
tiffs had no knowledge of their ward's 
Rouse, 48 Wis.2d 528, 180 N.W.2d 521 (1970) 
(legal malpractice). 
4. Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 39 Cal.App.3d 
315, 114 Cal.Rptr. 171 (1974) (wrongful death); 
Peteler v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 
(1932) (medical malpractice prior to passage of 
§ 78-14-4). 
5. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-12-19 (recovery of any 
estate sold by an executor or administrator); 
§ 78-12-26(1) (waste or trespass by under-
ground works on a mining claim); § 78-12-
26(2) (loss of branded livestock); § 78-12-
26(3) (fraud); § 78-12-27 (actions against cor-
porate stockholders or directors); § 78-14-4 
(health care malpractice), interpreted in Foil v. 
Bailinger, Utah, 601 P.2d 144 (1979). 
6. E.g., Vincent v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 583 
P.2d 105 (1978); Rice v. Granite School Dis-
trict, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969). 
7. Hart v. Hart, Fla.App.. 234 So.2d 393 (1970) 
(conversion); Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & 
Price, 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359 (1969) (legal 
malpractice); Thompson v. Equitable Life As-
surance Soc. of U.S., 447 Pa. 271, 290 A.2d 422 
(1972) (recovery on insurance policy); Med-
Mar, Inc. v. Dilworth, 214 Pa.Super. 402, 257 
A.2d 910 (1969) (architect's malpractice); Fam-
ily Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Cicarello, 157 
W.Va. 983, 207 S.E.2d 157 (1974) (legal mal-
practice). Compare cases cited in note 3. 
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death and therefore no knowledge that a 
cause of action existed until after the two-
year limitations period had expired. The 
closest precedent for that circumstance is 
apparently Praznik v. Sport Aero, Inc., 42 
Ill.App.3d 330, 365 N.EJ2d 686 (1976). In 
that case, plaintiffs decedents did not re-
turn from a long flight in a small private 
airplane. The wreckage of the plane, in 
which all occupants perished, was not dis-
covered until about two years and eight 
months after their disappearance. The ap-
plicable limitation would have barred any 
action if the statutory period commenced at 
the time of death. However, the Illinois 
court held that the action was timely be-
cause the cause of action did not accrue 
until the wreckage was discovered and the 
plaintiff received knowledge of the deaths. 
This application of the discovery rule was 
apparently based on a balancing test The 
hardship the statute of limitations would 
impose on the plaintiff in the circumstances 
of that case outweighed any prejudice to 
the defendant from difficulties of proof 
caused by the passage of time. 
In this case, the policy against stale 
claims is also outweighed by the unique 
circumstances of plaintiffs' hardship. De-
fendant cannot establish that he was preju-
diced by having to defend a stale claim 
since his problems of proof occasioned by 
the delay are no greater than the plaintiffs'. 
In contrast, plaintiffs could not file an ac-
tion for damages or even initiate investiga-
tive efforts to determine the cause of a 
death of which they had no knowledge.8 
Plaintiffs therefore had no alternative oth-
er than to bring their action after the statu-
tory limitation period had expired. If 
plaintiffs are denied the opportunity of pro-
ceeding with that action, the law would be 
in the untenable position of having created 
a remedy for plaintiffs and then barring 
them from exercising it before they had 
any practical opportunity to do so. 
According to the facts alleged by the 
plaintiffs, this is an appropriate circum-
stance to apply the exceptional "discovery 
8. This is not a case where the fact of death was 
known but the cause of the fatal accident was 
rule." Praznik v. Sport Aero, Inc., supra. 
If plaintiffs are unable to prove their alle-
gations of due diligence at trial, this action 
would still be barred by the statute of limi-
tations unless plaintiffs can prevail by proof 
of their alternate theory of concealment or 
misleading by defendant. All we hold here 
is that it was improper for the trial court to 
dismiss plaintiffs' action on the pleadings 
on the basis of the statute of limitations. 
The judgment of the district court is 
therefore reversed, and the cause is re-
manded for proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. Costs to appellant 
STEWART, J., and THORNLEY 
SWAN, District Judge, concur. 
K. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring): 
I concur. We have two alternatives in 
dealing with the problem here presented. 
The first alternative is to closely adhere to 
the statute which in its wording makes no 
allowance for the unusual circumstance of 
the death not being discovered until after 
the period of limitations had run. The 
second alternative is to carve out an excep-
tion to the statutory language and allow 
the plaintiffs to pursue their claim, where 
through no fault of their own the fact of 
death could not have been discovered earli-
er. 
This Court in Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 
Utah 2d 27, 492 ?J2d 1335 (1972), was faced 
with a somewhat similar problem where a 
two-year old child was injured due to an 
alleged defect of a city street Section 10-
7-77, U.C.A. 1953, provided that a claim 
against a city for injury caused by a defec-
tive street must be presented within 30 
days. The parents of the child did not 
present the claim to the city until seven 
months later. We upheld the dismissal of 
the lawsuit because the claim had not been 
timely filed. We followed an earlier deci-
sion of this Court, Hurley v. Bingham, 63 
Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924), and refused to 
make an exception to the statute even 
though the child was under legal disability. 
not. E.g., Walker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Fla. 
App.f 320 So.2d 418 (1975). 
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We announced that if there was any change 
to be made to the statute it should be done 
by a clear expression of the Legislature. 
We followed that rule in Varoz v. Sevey, 29 
Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973), involving 
a minor's claim under our tort claims act, 
§ 63-30-13, U.C.A. 1953. 
There is merit to the position of refusing 
to make an exception to the plain wording 
of a statute which makes no allowance for 
the legal disability of a child, or in this case, 
for learning of the death after the statute 
of limitations had run. We should be care-
ful not to encroach upon legislative prerog-
ative. However, there may well be a denial 
of constitutional rights in foreclosing per-
sons from access to the court under these 
unusual circumstances. Besides the consti-
tutional guarantees of due process and 
equal protection of the law, our Utah Con-
stitution, Article I, Section 11, provides that 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person . . . 
shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without deni-
a l . . . . " 
Because of these constitutional protec-
tions, I think this Court is required to take 
the position followed by the majority opin-
ion and judicially create an exception to the 
statute which has failed to recognize this 
unique fact situation. To refer the problem 
to the Legislature as we did in Gallegos v. 
Midvale City, supra, would be to deny these 
plaintiffs their constitutional rights. We 
recognized that denial in Scott v. School 
Board, Utah, 568 P.2d 746 (1977), and im-
pliedly overruled Gallegos v. Midvale City, 
supra, and Varoz v. Sevey, supra. 
HALL, C. J., having disqualified himself, 
does not participate herein; SWAN, Dis-
trict Judge, sat. 
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J & M CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 11, 1981. 
Mother brought wrongful death action 
against her son's employer, after her son 
was killed during course of his employment 
in a cave-in incident. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, 
J., dismissed action, and mother appealed. 
The Supreme Court held that Workmen's 
Compensation Act was exclusive vehicle for 
recovery of compensation for injury or 
death against employer of decedent, not-
withstanding fact that plaintiff was not a 
"dependent" under the Compensation Act 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result 
Workers' Compensation $=»2145 
Workmen's Compensation Act was ex-
clusive vehicle for recovery of compensation 
for injury or death against employer of 
decedent, notwithstanding fact that plain-
tiff was not a "dependent," and thus could 
not recover, under the Compensation Act. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-60, 78-11-
7; Const Art. 16, § 5. 
(p % KEY NUMBER SYSUM> 
Gary A. Frank, Murray, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
David Eckersley, Salt Lake City, for de-
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PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judg-
ment dismissing an action brought by ap-
pellant under Title 78-11-7, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, known as the Wrongful 
Death Act, against her son's employer, af-
ter her son was killed during the course of 
his employment in a cave-in incident 
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Institution of proceedings. Police actions. 
The state has not waived its governmental Plaintiff's state law claims against police 
immunity for negligence arising out of the officers for assault, unlawful detention, and 
institution or prosecution of any judicial or intentional infliction of emotional distress were 
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or barred by the state governmental immunity 
without probable cause. Devlin v. Smalley, 4 F. act. Oliver v. Woods, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (D. 
Supp. 2d 1315 (D. Utah 1998). Utah 1998). 
Natural conditions. Schools. 
College officials were immune from claims Like local school districts, the state school for 
filed by the parents of a student who died in a
 t h e d e a f a n d b l i n d s h a r e s i n s t a t e sovereign 
fall from a cliff, because the cause of death was i m m u n i t y . Sutton v. Utah State School for the 
the naturally occurring cliffs, not the act of Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999). 
planning a party in the vicinity of the cliffs. 
Apffel v. Huddleston, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Cited in Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 
Utah 1999). 945 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Case Law Waivers After Taylor v. Ogden School District, 
Developments: Restoration of Governmental 1997 Utah L. Rev. 1138. 
Immunity: The Assault Exception to Immunity 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service 
— Legal disability [Effective until July 1, 2001]. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the 
claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining 
an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, 
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an 
incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, 
when the claim is against a school district or board of education; 
(D) the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is 
against a special district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of 
Utah; or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or 
executive secretary, when the claim is against any other public 
board, commission, or body. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent 
and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant 
may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
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(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court 
may extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the appli-
cable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the dela}' in serving the notice of claim will substantially 
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 
Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — 
Service — Legal disability — Appointment of 
guardian ad litem [Effective July 1, 2001]. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the 
claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining 
an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, 
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an 
incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, 
when the claim is against a school district or board of education; 
(D) the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is 
against a special district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of 
Utah; or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or 
executive secretary, when the claim is against any other public 
board, commission, or body. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent 
and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant 
may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court 
may extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the appli-
cable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially 
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 
(d) (i) If am injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim 
against a governmental entity is sustained by a potential claimant 
63-30-11 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 60 
described in Subsection (4)(a), that government entity may file a 
request with the court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for 
the potential claimant. 
(ii) If a guardian ad litem is appointed under this Subsection (4)(d), 
the time for filing a claim under Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 
begins when the order appointing the guardian is issued. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch. 
27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 75, § 4; 
1991, ch. 76, § 6; 1998, ch. 164, § 1; 2000, ch. 
157, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted uthe 
employee's" for "his" in Subsection (2); deleted 
ANALYSIS 
Notice. 
Sufficiency of notice. 
—Nature of claim asserted. 
—Statement of facts. 
Notice. 
The filing of a notice of claim upon the 
governing body of a third class city, pursuant to 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, is sat-
isfied by filing the notice of claim with the city 
recorder. Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 
P.2d 343 (Utah 1998). 
Letters hand-delivered to the county Board of 
Commissioners, which set forth the facts sur-
rounding a boundary dispute, but were not 
worded so as to alert the Board or the county to 
any impending legal action and made no men-
tion of the plaintiff's intention to seek any 
judicial remedy, were not sufficient notice of a 
claim and the actual notice did not cure the 
failure to comply strictly with the requirements 
of this chapter. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 
1999 UT 36, 977 P.2d 1201. 
Because the plaintiffs did not give written 
notice of claim to the defendant school district 
and its employees, their claim failed for failure 
to meet the requirements of the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act. Jensen v. Reeves, 45 F. 
Supp. 2d 1265 (D. Utah 1999). 
A.L.R. — Complaint as satisfying require-
ment of notice of claim upon states, municipali-
ties, and other political subdivisions, 45 
A.L.R.5th 109. 
Persons or entities upon whom notice of in-
jury or claim against state or state agencies 
may or must be served, 45 A.L.R.5th 173. 
Sufficiency of notice of claim against local 
government unit as regards identity, name, 
"the responsible governmental entity according 
to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 
63-30-13" from Subsection (3XbMii); added Sub-
sections (3XbXiiXA) to (3)(bXiiXF); and made 
stylistic changes throughout the section. 
The 2000 amendment, effective July 1. 2001, 
added Subsection (4)(d). 
Because a judge was an officer of a state 
governmental entity, notice of claim require-
ments applied with respect to all acts or omis-
sions occurring in the course of her employment 
or under color of authority, whether part of her 
judicial acts or of her administrative responsi-
bilities. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, 987 P.2d 
36. 
Sufficiency of notice. 
—Nature of claim asserted. 
Letter sent by plaintiffs counsel to defendant 
that did not state a claim or any intention to 
make one, nor state the amount of damages 
incurred or provide any other information 
about the extent or nature of damages did not 
comply with the requirement that a notice of 
claim set forth the nature of the claim and the 
damages. Johnson v. City of Bountiful, 996 F. 
Supp. 1100 (D. Utah 1998). 
—Statement of facts. 
Letter sent by plaintiffs counsel that in-
cluded the police report of the accident on 
which the lawsuit was based and that informed 
the defendant that plaintiff was injured was 
sufficient to comply with the requirement that 
a notice of claim set forth a brief statement of 
the facts. Johnson v. City of Bountiful. 996 F. 
Supp. 1100 (D. Utah 1998). 
address, and residence of claimant, 53 
A.L.R.5th 617. 
Sufficiency of notice of claim against local 
political entity as regards time when accident 
occurred, 57 A.L.R.5th 689. 
Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, failure to give 
or defects in notice of claim against state or 
local political subdivision — modern status, 64 
A.L.R.5th 519. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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Section 63-30-13, U.C.A., 1953 as amended 
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63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for 
filing notice. 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed 
with the attorney general within one year after the claim arises, or before the 
expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless 
of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 12; 1978, ch. 
27, § 6; 1983, ch. 131, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 5; 
1998, ch. 164, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted "the 
employee's" for "his" near the beginning and 
deleted "and the agency concerned" after "attor-
ney general." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Compliance with section. 
Recovery of real property. 
Cited. 
Compliance with section. 
Where a plaintiff did not file a notice of claim 
against the state and its employees until more 
than two years after the incident at issue, his 
claim was barred. Devlin v. Smalley, 4 F. Supp. 
2d 1315 (D. Utah 1998). 
Although plaintiffs amended complaint was 
minimally sufficient to state a claim for wrong-
ful refusal to allow writ of habeas corpus, the 
claim was barred for failure to comply with the 
requirements of the immunity statute because 
it was not filed until almost two years after the 
denial of plaintiffs petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus and it was never filed with the Attorney 
General. Straley v. Halliday, 997 P.2d 338 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2000). 
Recovery of real property. 
The one year statute of limitations under this 
section applied to a claim against the Depart-
ment of Transportation arising from the sale of 
property to the Department, which the plaintiff 
claimed was invalid as not properly executed, 
because the action was not a claim on a con-
tractual obligation under § 63-30-5, which 
would be exempt from this section, but was 
rather a claim to recover property under § 63-
30-6. Bullock v. State, DOT, 966 P.2d 1215 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Cited in Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 
P.2d 343 (Utah 1998). 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its em-
ployee — Time for filing notice. 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of 
claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision according to 
the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year after the claim arises, or 
before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 13; 1978, ch. 
27, § 7; 1983, ch. 131, § 3; 1987, ch. 75, § 6; 
1998, ch. 164, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted "the 
employee's" for "his" near the beginning and 
inserted "according to the requirements of Sec-
tion 63-30-11* after "political subdivision." 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 
P.2d 343 (Utah 1998). 
63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by gov-
ernmental entity or insurance carrier within 
ninety days. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Noncompliance. was properly dismissed as being untimely. 
Action for conveyance of excess acreage filed Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, 977 
one and a half years after filing a notice of claim P.2d 1201. 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time 
for filing action against governmental entity. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Dismissal proper, was properly dismissed as being untimely. 
Action for conveyance of excess acreage filed Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, 977 
one and a half years after filing a notice of claim P.2d 1201. 
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions — 
Application of Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(1) The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any 
action brought under this chapter. 
(2) An action brought under this chapter may not be tried as a small claims 
action and shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent 
they are consistent with this chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 16; 1983, ch. sion, adding the Subsection (1) and (2) designa-
129, § 7; 1999, ch. 166, § 1. tions; added "may not be tried as a small claims 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- action and" in Subsection (2); and made stylis-
ment, effective May 3, 1999, divided the provi- tic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Sovereign immunity in federal courts. suits against the state amounts to a positive 
The state governmental immunity statute expression of policy against suits against Utah 
goes beyond mere consent to be sued in the in federal courts. Sutton v. Utah State School 
state's own courts; its express declaration that for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 
those courts are the exclusive tribunals for 1999). 
63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff in action. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Time for filing. dismissal of his suit by recharacterizing his 
Where the plaintiff failed to file a defamation claim as a fourteenth amendment violation, 
claim within one year of the accrual of the Hummel v. McCotter, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (D. 
action, and also failed to file an undertaking as Utah 1998). 
required by § 63-30-19, he could not avoid 
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